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Abstract 
This paper introduces the PSCORE, which aggregates nine personal characteristics of chief executive officers 
(CEOs), to signal the quality of earnings. The PSCORE is a composite score based on publicly available data on 
CEOs. The study reports strong positive relationships between the PSCORE and two different proxies for earnings 
quality, (i) discretionary accruals and (ii) financial statement errors, measured by deviations of the first digits of 
figures reported in financial statements from those expected by Benford’s Law. Further analyses indicate that the 
relationships between the PSCORE and the proxies for earnings quality become more pronounced when CEOs 
have high equity-based compensation incentives. The findings have some implications for practitioners.  
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1 Introduction 
A substantial body of the existing research is committed to developing, validating, and improving 
empirical models estimating earnings quality. This paper contributes to this emerging seam of literature by 
introducing a novel approach that uses publicly available information on the personal profiles of chief executive 
officers (hereafter CEOs) to red flag poor earnings quality in individual firms. 
An accepted methodology for capturing earnings quality is to estimate discretionary accruals (Dechow 
et al. 2010). Discretionary accruals are the residuals (or error terms) in the regressions between accruals and firms’ 
characteristics (e.g., Jones 1991; Dechow et al. 1995; Dechow and Dichev 2002; Kothari et al. 2005). Despite 
their importance, earnings quality models are subject to considerable criticism. A major limitation of accrual-
based models is the absence of an adequate understanding of the properties of accruals and a theory of the accrual-
generating process, such that large-magnitude regression residuals may be taken to infer poor quality of earnings 
(Fields et al. 2001; Dechow et al. 2010; Gerakos 2012; Ball 2013; Jackson 2018). There is also increasing concern 
that accrual-based models are poorly specified (Holthausen et al. 1995; Fields et al. 2001; Dechow et al. 2010; 
Ball 2013), that there may be measurement errors in estimating accruals (Hribar and Collins 2002), and that there 
may be statistical biases in the inferences made about earnings management (Christodoulou et al. 2018; 
McNichols and Stubben 2018). Also, as most models require large datasets in order for time-series or cross-
sectional regressions to be run, their application remains limited because of data constraints (Dechow et al. 1995; 
Dechow et al. 2011; Amiram et al. 2015; Nguyen et al. 2015).  
Although there are theories that support the notion of the profile of the CEO playing an influential role 
in determining earnings quality, the existing literature in this area is relatively underdeveloped. For example, the 
upper echelons theory proposes that the decision-making process of executive managers is influenced by 
individual managers’ interpretation of the strategic situations they face, and that such interpretations could, in 
turn, be affected by personal characteristics such as experience and personality, among others (Hambrick and 
Mason 1984; Hambrick 2007). The upper echelons theory predicts that organizational outcomes are directly 
determined by the discretion of top executive managers (Hambrick et al. 2005). Given that CEOs have overall 
responsibility for firm performance, it is reasonable to assume that they can indeed influence the financial 
statements that present the financial performance, financial position, and cash flows of their companies. Because 
accounting standards allow the use of professional judgment in the choice of appropriate accounting policies or 
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estimation of accounting numbers, when uncertainties exist, this makes the characteristics of CEOs relevant to the 
financial decision-making process and worthy of closer inspection.  
Also, under the efficient contracting theory (e.g., Francis et al. 2008; Jian and Lee 2011), CEOs with 
high credibility (such as a good reputation) produce high-quality organizational outcomes because they have more 
to lose (compensation, future career, etc.) if they are involved in harmful activities. Recently, Liang et al. (2018) 
have offered a theory on the relationship between the credibility of financial reporting and the credibility of 
managers. The authors theorize that, because of limited tenure or the horizon problem (Dechow and Sloan 1991), 
managers have an incentive to maximize the stock price at the time of their retirement. Liang and colleagues also 
find that dishonest managers can choose to manage earnings and that discretionary accruals are higher and more 
volatile in firms with less credible CEOs. What the model of Liang et al. (2018) tells us is that we can use CEOs’ 
profiles to study earnings quality. 
In this paper, we offer a single measure that captures various CEO characteristics and uses them to signal 
earnings quality. We construct a proxy that we name the PSCORE, based on nine CEO characteristics that have 
previously been documented in the accounting literature to be important determinants of earnings quality. 
Specifically, the PSCORE utilizes (i) role experience as a CEO, (ii) previous working experience as a chief 
financial officer, (iii) finance-related qualifications, (iv) early years of service in the firm, (v) performance during 
the last three years of tenure, (vi) press coverage, (vii) CEO serving as chairperson, (viii) CEO who is a founder 
of the firm, and (ix) age. This paper tests whether the PSCORE is positively correlated with other established 
proxies for earnings quality.  
The research employs established proxies for earnings quality, acknowledging recent developments in 
the field. We use two different types of earnings quality measures: (i) discretionary accruals (Jones 1991; Dechow 
et al. 1995; Peasnell et al. 2000) and (ii) financial statement errors, measured by deviations of the first digits of 
figures reported in financial statements from those expected by Benford’s Law (Amiram et al. 2015; Nigrini 2015). 
The research uses a sample of 3,395 firm-year observations (615 unique firms) of companies listed on 
the London Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2012. Consistent with predictions, the results demonstrate strong 
positive relationships between the PSCORE and the established proxies for earnings quality. Specifically, the 
univariate evidence shows that the levels of both earnings quality proxies increase monotonically as the PSCORE 
increases. The multivariate regression findings show that the PSCORE is positively and significantly related to 
the magnitudes of discretionary accruals and deviations of first digits from Benford’s Law, after controlling for 
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important determinants of earnings quality. Further analyses indicate that the relationships between the PSCORE 
and the established proxies for earnings quality are stronger for firms with CEOs with higher equity-based 
incentives. The evidence substantiates the proposition that the personal profiles of CEOs do matter for earnings 
quality. The results remain robust even after introducing manipulation checks, e.g. when we include a proxy for 
CEO overconfidence in the PSCORE, and when we use proxies for real earnings management as an alternative 
measure of earnings quality.  
Our research findings contribute to the literature and practice, as follows. Firstly, as the data used to 
construct the PSCORE are available in the public domain, as they form part of CEOs’ curriculum vitae, the 
PSCORE is easy to obtain. Also, because neither time-series nor cross-sectional data are required for estimating 
the PSCORE, it can be widely applied, which is especially important in capital markets where data are not publicly 
available or are costly to collect. Secondly, the paper is the first research attempt to aggregate various 
characteristics of CEOs into a single index that can be used to signal quality of earnings. Previously published 
attempts have been limited to the effects of a few individual CEO characteristics on earnings quality (e.g., Francis 
et al. 2008; Malmendier and Tate 2009; Jiang et al. 2010; Huang et al. 2012; Kuang et al. 2014; Ali and Zhang 
2015). Our paper also provides some empirical evidence to support the theoretical framework of Liang et al. 
(2018) on the relationship between CEO’s credibility and earnings quality. Thirdly, this paper makes a novel and 
original contribution as it uses CEO characteristics to signal the presence of financial statement errors, as a result 
of costly material misstatements. As the PSCORE can signal the likelihood of misrepresentation of financial 
statements, regardless of whether they result from intentional or unintentional acts, it is of value to practice.  
The PSCORE could be a useful tool for auditors, boards of directors, and investment professionals, in 
aiding the assessment of the risks of poor earnings quality. It also has the potential to identify and thus regulate 
risks related to financial reporting quality. For example, external auditors could use the PSCORE to assess the 
risks of material misstatements. Auditing standards (e.g., International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board 
(IAASB) 2009; Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 2010) require the risk assessment procedures of 
auditors to include an understanding of the entity and its environment, including the management’s philosophy 
and operating style. High discretionary accruals and large financial statement errors, which are associated with a 
high PSCORE, could result from the inappropriate application of accounting standards, meaning that they could 
act as red flags for material accounting misstatements. The evidence implies that auditors should be cautious when 
dealing with firms with high-PSCORE CEOs.  
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. We first explain the construction of the PSCORE and 
the hypothesis development. Then, we describe the methodology used to test the validity of the PSCORE, focusing 
on sample selection, the calculation of empirical proxies for earnings quality, and the multivariate regression 
models. After that, we provide findings and conclusions. 
2 Construction of the PSCORE and hypothesis development 
The PSCORE covers nine aspects of CEO characteristics that have been identified in the existing 
literature as being correlated with earnings quality. Individual characteristics can be categorized into financial 
expertise (experience in role, previous working experience as a chief financial officer, and advanced finance-
related qaualification/certification), reputation (performance during the last three year of CEO tenure, early years 
of service of CEOs in a firm, and press coverage), internal power (CEOs serving as the chairperson of the board 
of directors and CEOs serving as the founder or co-founder of the firms), and age. Our general approach is that 
we create indicator variables taking the value of 1 if previous research has shown that a particular individual factor 
is associated with poor earnings quality, and 0 otherwise. We briefly discuss related literature on each individual 
characteristic in the following paragraphs. 
2.1 Financial expertise 
The existing literature documents financial expertise as a determinant of earnings quality. The financial 
expertise of audit committees has been found to be positively correlated with earnings quality (Bédard et al. 2004; 
Badolato et al. 2014). Similarly, Aier et al. (2005) demonstrate that the financial expertise of chief financial 
officers helps to improve earnings quality, e.g., by reducing earnings restatements. They argue that chief financial 
officers with high financial expertise are less likely to be involved in earnings restatements because they will play 
a better role in designing and implementing internal control and financial reporting processes, resulting in higher 
earnings quality. Financial expertise is also important for CEOs because they have a legal duty to sign off on the 
true and fair financial statements of their companies. For example, Gounopoulos and Pham (2018) find that 
financial expert CEOs help to reduce earnings management around initial public offerings.2 In this paper, we 
expect that the financial expertise of CEOs is likely to be associated with high earnings quality.  
 
2 This evidence is also consistent with the work of Custódio and Metzger (2014), which shows that financial expert CEOs lead 
to favourable financial outcomes for firms. 
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In line with the above evidence, the first three factors of the PSCORE are financial expertise proxies. 
Following Aier et al. (2005), we measure financial expertise using CEOs’ role experience (pROLE), experience 
as a chief financial officer (pCFO), and advanced finance-related certification (pCERT). Details of the variable 
calculations are presented as an appendix. The rationale for using these three proxies is that CEOs may have 
different ways of gaining financial expertise. Experience in the role of CEO will help them to do so. CEOs may 
also gain financial expertise working as a chief financial officer because that position is directly responsible for 
the preparation of financial statements. Finally, studying for an advanced finance-related certification would be a 
way to gain such expertise.3 
2.2 Reputation 
The next group of individual factors of the PSCORE are related to the reputation of CEOs. Admittedly, 
there is mixed evidence on the impact of CEOs’ reputation on earnings quality. Some previous studies show that 
a good reputation is associated with low earnings quality, including Malmendier and Tate (2009), who find that 
award-winning, “superstar” CEOs inflate reported earnings and extract higher compensation. Similarly, Wade et 
al. (2006) find a negative relationship between the reputation of “celebrity” CEOs and organizational outcomes 
in the long term. However, the above-mentioned studies remain outliers, as more studies (Francis et al., 2008; Jian 
& Lee, 2011; Milbourn, 2003) find reputation to have a positive link with earnings quality. Indeed, Francis et al. 
(2008) find that firms with low earnings quality are more likely to hire new CEOs with a better reputation than 
the preceding one and that, after hiring a reputable CEO, those firms do not manipulate earnings in the long term. 
The findings of Francis et al. (2008) suggest that reputable CEOs help to improve earnings quality, because 
earnings management practices in the hiring firms disappear.  
This paper hypothesizes that reputable CEOs are more likely to be associated with high earnings quality, 
despite the mixed results discussed above, for the following reasons. The results obtained by Francis et al. (2008) 
are consistent with previous studies (e.g., Jian and Lee 2011) that also find reputable CEOs lead to high-quality 
 
3 Although some papers (Klein 2002; Bédard et al. 2004; Badolato et al. 2014) refer to membership of an audit committee as 
an indicator of financial expertise, the PSCORE does not include this indicator, to avoid overidentification. Most corporate 
governance codes require an audit committee to have at least one member with a financial background (FRC, 2003; FRC, 
2012). Therefore, any member of an audit committee is likely to have a finance-related certification or finance-related work 
experience. These characteristics have already been captured by the other three financial expertise factors in the PSCORE. 
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organizational outcomes, the explanation being that they would have more to lose (compensation, future career, 
etc.) if they were involved with activities that were harmful to the organizations they worked for. The few studies 
that find an inverse relationship use selective and purposeful samples. For example, Malmendier and Tate (2009) 
use a sample of award-winning CEOs, and Wade et al. (2006) use a sample of those who have been selected as 
CEOs of the year. The uniqueness of these purposive samples limits the generalizability of the findings.  
Based on the greater volume of prior research (Milbourn 2003; Francis et al. 2008; Jian and Lee 2011) 
suggesting a positive relationship between CEO reputation and earnings quality, the next three individual factors 
of the PSCORE are proxies for reputation, including performance during the last three years of the CEO’s tenure 
(pROA), whether the CEO is still early on in their position at the firm (pEARLY), and press coverage (pPRESS). 
Details of the variable calculations are presented as an appendix. The rationale for the latter’s inclusion is that 
reputable CEOs with good firm performance, longer tenures, and performance acknowledged by the board of 
directors would have caught the eye of the media (Milbourn 2003). The inclusion of the measure capturing 
whether the CEO is still relatively new to their position at the firm is consistent with empirical evidence indicating 
that earnings quality tends to be low in CEOs’ first three years at a firm because they have incentives to manipulate 
earnings to demonstrate their ability when the market’s perception of them is still uncertain (Ali and Zhang 2015). 
2.3 Internal power 
The next set of individual factors of the PSCORE are related to the internal power of CEOs in the firms. 
In most companies, CEOs are more powerful if they serve as the chairperson of the board of directors or if they 
are the founder of the firm. As corporate governance codes place strong accountabilities on the position of 
chairperson, they will play a very important role in overseeing activities such as monitoring the integrity of the 
financial reporting process (e.g., FRC, 2003, 2012). Founders, by virtue of their position, would be expected to 
participate in all the important business and financial policies of the company. Empirical evidence shows that 
powerful CEOs are more likely to engage in earnings management and accounting fraud (Dechow et al. 1996; 
Farber 2005; Feng et al. 2011). For example, Feng et al. (2011) provide evidence suggesting that powerful CEOs 
may dominate the firm’s board of directors as well as the chief financial officer, thereby overriding internal control 
systems. In such situations, the chief financial officer could come under pressure from the CEO and thus collude 
to manipulate earnings.  
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Based on the above research, the next two individual factors account for CEOs serving as the chairperson 
of the board of directors (pCHAIRMAN) and CEOs who are also the founder or co-founder of the firm 
(pFOUNDER). Details of the variable calculations are presented as an appendix. In this paper, we expect powerful 
CEOs to be more likely to be associated with low earnings quality. 
2.4 Age 
The last individual factor of the PSCORE is the age of the CEO. There are indications in the existing 
literature about the effect of CEO age on earnings quality. Huang et al. (2012), Yim (2013), and Serfling (2014) 
find that older CEOs are less likely to manage earnings. The research also considers the horizontal problem of 
CEOs’ tenure (e.g., Dechow and Sloan 1991; Kalyta 2009; Ali and Zhang 2015), which suggests that CEOs are 
more likely to manipulate earnings when they are young, or their age is close to retirement age. Thus, the next 
factor of the PSCORE is the age of the CEO (pAGE), which takes into account both young CEOs and and close 
to retirement CEOs at the same time. Details of the variable calculations are presented as an appendix. 
2.5 Other potential factors 
In addition to the above-mentioned CEO characteristics, there might be some other candidates for the 
construction of the PSCORE. For example, gender could be a factor because female directors are found to be 
more conservative, and therefore may be less likely to manipulate earnings (Barua et al. 2010). Marital status 
could also be relevant, as Hilary et al. (2016) provide evidence that firms with married CEOs exhibit higher 
earnings quality than firms whose CEOs are single, the explanation being that married CEOs are more risk-averse 
and less likely to engage in earnings management. Jia et al. (2014) find that facial masculinity is positively 
correlated with various measures of earnings quality. They argue that the hormone testosterone, which determines 
face shape, is also related to risk-taking behaviour such as involvement in financial misreporting activities. 
Narcissistic CEOs are more likely to manipulate earnings, a behaviour consistent with their tendency for self-
overidentification (Capalbo et al. 2018). There are other CEO characteristics which may also be linked with 
earnings quality, e.g. overconfidence (Ahmed and Duellman 2013), management style (Bertrand and Schoar 
2003), managerial ability (Demerjian et al. 2013), vocal tone optimism (Davis et al. 2015), origin (Kuang et al. 
2014), and personal life behaviours such as having a legal record or using luxury goods (Davidson et al. 2015). 
The PSCORE does not include the potential candidates mentioned above for the following reasons. 
Firstly, the PSCORE already has a variable for age, which is an observable summary statistic that can be used to 
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characterize different personality traits of CEOs, such as effort, risk aversion, expected tenure, and human capital 
(Joos et al. 2003). Secondly, only 81 out of the 3,395 firm-year observations (2.39%) have female CEOs. Given 
the lack of gender diversity among the CEOs, we did not include gender in the PSCORE. Thirdly, it was not 
possible to obtain data on marital status, masculinity, or narcissism in the public domain for all CEOs in the 
sample, and therefore including those factors in the PSCORE would have substantially reduced the sample and 
its usability for analysis. 
2.6 The composite PSCORE 
We believed that the construction of a single measure for CEO characteristics would help to mitigate 
concerns about potential multicollinearity as a result of individual factors being separately included (see, e.g., 
Larcker et al. 2007; Dey 2008; Ellul and Yerramilli 2013; Custódio and Metzger 2014). As explained above, we 
have constructed nine indicator variables taking the value of either 1 or 0. The PSCORE is, therefore, a composite 
score which aggregates the nine indicator variables. The PSCORE of a CEO who works for firm i in year t is 
calculated as follows: 
𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑝𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝑅𝑂𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝐸𝐴𝑅𝐿𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝐹𝑂𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑝𝐶𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡            (1) 
Under this construction, the PSCORE value theoretically ranges from zero to nine. A higher PSCORE 
suggests lower earnings quality. We also perform principal component analysis to see whether the construction 
of the PSCORE based on nine equally weighted factors is defensible. 
Because the main purpose of the study was to introduce a tool which could easily be applied by the 
average practitioner to quickly assess the risk of low earnings quality in individual firms, we limited the PSCORE 
to include CEO characteristics from publicly available data, e.g. data that could be collected from CEOs’ 
curriculum vitae or financial statements. We are satisfied that the PSCORE does cover some significant categories 
established by previous research on CEO profiles, which serves the situation well. The hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: The PSCORE is positively associated with low earnings quality. 
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3 Methodology 
3.1 Sample selection 
We begin with all firms listed on the London Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2012. The sample starts from 
2005 to avoid the effect of IFRS adoption (2005) in the UK on earnings quality, and it ends in 2012 to avoid the 
effect of the new corporate governance code released by the Financial Reporting Council (Financial Reporting 
Council (FRC) 2012), which replaced the Corporate Governance Code that was issued in 1992 by the Cadbury 
Committee. The sample includes only those stocks that were live as of 31st December 2012. While survivorship 
bias may exist, we omit dead stocks because our research requires extensive data on CEOs and corporate 
governance which may not be available for delisted firms. Financial statements and International Securities 
Identification Number (ISIN hereafter) are downloaded from Datastream. We exclude banks, insurance 
companies, financial services, and utility firms. Companies with negative market values or negative book values 
of equity are also deleted.  
To calculate deviations of first digits of figures reported in financial statements from Benford’s Law, a 
measure of earnings quality, we firstly replace missing values with zeros.4 Because the research studies the first 
digits from one to nine, replacing missing values with zeros does not affect our analysis. The next step is to extract 
the first digits of all items in the balance sheets, income statements, and cash flow statements. Similar to Amiram 
et al. (2015), this research takes the first digit after the negative sign if a number is negative, and takes the first 
non-zero digit if a number has an absolute value less than one. The total number of first digits for each company 
in each year is counted. Finally, we exclude observations with fewer than 50 first digits (or 50 figures in their 
financial statements) in total, to avoid measurement errors, because those firms might be too young or not have 
continuing operations, therefore including them might reduce the statistical meaning of the findings (Amiram et 
al. 2015).5 As a result, we derive 5,110 firm-year observations from 2005 to 2012 (717 unique companies) with 
389,619 first digits. This sample is used to calculate the deviations from Benford’s Law for the firm-year 
observations. 
 
4 This approach does not apply to the calculation of the other variables. 
5 As a robustness test (not tabulated), we include observations with fewer than 50 first digits and the findings do not change 
qualitatively. 
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In the next step, we construct the CEO data. In the first stage, we use the ISIN codes to search for the 
company in the Bloomberg database; then, we identify the CEO for each company and year. When we cannot find 
the name of the CEO in a particular year in Bloomberg, we download the annual report from Key Note and look 
under the role description section or at signatures (with role descriptions) on CEO reports and financial statements, 
as the managing director or executive chairperson could play the role of CEO. If there is an appointment of a new 
CEO in a particular year, we choose the new CEO because we believe that the latest CEO will be the person with 
the greater influence on the financial statements prepared after year-end. Companies with missing or joint CEOs 
are deleted. In the second stage, we search for the biographies of the CEOs in Bloomberg. If Bloomberg does not 
provide a biography for a CEO, we search the Key Note platform using the CEO’s name and ISIN code. If there 
is still no biography found from the above procedures, we read the annual reports downloaded from Key Note to 
search for CEO information in the role description section. We also search in the Financial Times and LinkedIn 
for missing biographies. Finally, if we cannot find sufficient information for the calculation of the PSCORE, we 
delete the corresponding observation.  
Regarding the data on media coverage, we perform the following procedure. We search in the LexisNexis 
using the CEO’s full name and company name as the keywords. If there is no result, we search for the first name 
and last name (omitting the middle name). In the LexisNexis database, we tick the options to eliminate duplicates, 
exclude non-business news, and restrict research results to UK national newspapers.6 We count the total number 
of newspapers found in the search results. Although the above procedure for measuring press coverage is 
controversial, we believe that our measure captures the reputation of a CEO reasonably well. Firstly, although 
Lafond (2008) doubts whether all news is good news for the reputation of CEOs, Milbourn (2003), Francis et al. 
(2008), and Jian and Lee (2011) show that, overall, the total number of newspapers gives a fair representation of 
CEO reputation. Secondly, while prior studies have opened the search results to worldwide newspapers (for 
example, Francis et al. 2008), we argue that, if a global newspaper has headlines about the CEO of a UK listed 
 
6 UK national newspapers which are included in the research results in the LexisNexis database are the Daily Star, Daily Star 
Sunday, Express Online, Independent Print Ltd, MailOnline, Morning Star, The Business, The Daily Mail and Mail on Sunday 
(London), The Daily Telegraph (London), Telegraph (London), telegraph.co.uk, The Express, The Guardian, The Independent 
(United Kingdom), The Mirror (The Daily Mirror and The Sunday Mirror), mirror.co.uk, The Observer, The People, The 
Sunday, The Sunday Times (London), and The Times (London). 
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company, that news is also likely to be published in UK national newspapers. Therefore, expanding the research 
results to the global press may include duplicates. 
To collect data on corporate governance, for the control variables, we proceed as follows. The information 
on external auditors, boards of directors, and audit committees is collected from Bloomberg. Missing information 
is obtained from Key Note. We also search for compensation and other information in the annual reports. 
Observations with missing data are removed. 
Finally, we match the financial statement data, CEO data, and corporate governance data, based on the 
ISIN code and fiscal year. We derive 3,395 firm-year observations (615 unique companies) in 48 industries 
(Datastream Level 6) with sufficient data for us to study the PSCORE and discretionary accruals. The subsample 
in which we can study the PSCORE and the deviations of first digits of financial statement items from those are 
expected by Benford’s Law contains 2,810 firm-year observations.7 All continuous variables in the samples are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the influence of outliers.  
3.2 Empirical measures of earnings quality 
We have two types of proxies for earnings quality, which are discretionary accruals and financial 
statement errors. 
3.2.1 Discretionary accruals 
Prior research (Dechow et al. 2010; DeFond 2010) indicates that the use of discretionary accruals as a 
proxy for earnings quality is an accepted methodology in accounting. Higher levels of discretionary accruals 
suggest lower earnings quality. In the UK, Peasnell et al. (2000) show that no model outperforms the modified-
Jones model (Jones 1991; Dechow et al. 1995) in estimating discretionary accruals. Therefore, we employ the 
cross-sectional modified-Jones model to estimate discretionary accruals, where accruals are total or working 
capital accruals (used as substitutes).  
We run the cross-sectional modified-Jones model (Jones 1991; Dechow et al. 1995) for each industry-
year with at least ten observations, and calculate the absolute values of discretionary accruals (DAC) and 
discretionary working capital accruals (DWAC). DAC and DWAC are thus the first two proxies for earnings 
 
7 The subsample is smaller than the main sample because firms with fewer than 50 first digits are excluded. 
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quality. We use the absolute values of the discretionary accruals because we design the PSCORE to signal earnings 
quality without a particular emphasis on the directional effects of accruals on earnings.8 The reason is that the 
residuals from the accrual-based models reflect the amount of earnings being transferred from one year to another, 
thus both income-inflating and income-deflating accruals are more likely to result in low earnings quality, 
regardless of the directional effects of the amount of earnings transferred (Bergstresser and Philippon 2006). 
We also apply the margin model of Peasnell et al. (2000) to estimate discretionary working capital 
accruals because the margin model is found to be effective in estimating discretionary accruals in the UK. We run 
cross-sectional regressions following Peasnell et al. (2000) for each industry-year with at least ten observations 
and calculate the absolute values of the errors terms, denoting them by DAMP. DAMP is thus the next proxy for 
earnings quality. 
Although the models mentioned above are widely applied in accounting research, they are criticized due 
to their major limitations (e.g., Fields et al. 2001; Dechow et al. 2010; Gerakos 2012; Ball 2013; Owens et al. 
2013; Christodoulou et al. 2018; Jackson 2018; McNichols and Stubben 2018). Therefore, we employ an 
alternative measure of earnings quality that relies on Benford’s Law and is calculated from firm-year data alone. 
3.2.2 Financial statement errors  
The use of Benford’s Law to identify errors in data is common in accounting research (see, e.g., Carslaw 
1988; Thomas 1989; Nigrini 1996; Nigrini and Mittermaier 1997; Nigrini and Miller 2009; Amiram et al. 2015). 
For example, Carslaw (1988) studies the second digits of reported income in the financial statements of New 
Zealand firms and finds that the actual frequencies of zeros (nines) are more (less) than expected by Benford’s 
Law. He interprets this phenomenon as being caused by the rounding-up behaviour of managers, to achieve 
earnings targets. Consistent with Carslaw (1988), Thomas (1989) shows similar patterns in the US, but with less 
deviation of earnings numbers from the expectations derived from Benford’s Law.  
Recently, Amiram et al. (2015) have introduced a new way of applying Benford’s Law to signal financial 
statement errors using firm-year data. They develop an innovative score, namely the FSD_SCORE, to capture the 
deviations of the first digits of figures reported in financial statements, from Benford’s Law. The FSD_SCORE is 
 
8 Prior studies using the absolute values of discretionary accruals include Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), Jiang et al. (2010), 
Armstrong et al. (2010), and Hilary et al. (2016), to name just a few.  
14   T. T. Nguyen et al. 
also found to be correlated with earnings management and is helpful for predicting material accounting 
misstatements. Compared with other proxies for earnings quality, the FSD_SCORE has some significant 
advantages, such as not requiring a model for its estimation and the unlikeliness of there being an ex-ante 
relationship between the FSD_SCORE and firm characteristics and performance (Amiram et al. 2015).  
In this paper, we closely follow Amiram et al. (2015) and Nguyen et al. (2018) to calculate the 
FSD_SCORE, which is the mean absolute deviation of the first digits of figures reported in financial statements 
from what is expected based on Benford’s Law. When financial statements are free of errors, the FSD_SCORE 
equals zero because then the financial statements follow Benford’s Law (Amiram et al. 2015). An introduction of 
errors (which may result from intentional or unintentional acts) into the financial statements increases the 
deviations of the first digits, therefore the FSD_SCORE can be used as a proxy for earnings quality. The last 
measure of earnings quality is  KS statistic, which is the maximum deviation of digits from Benford’s Law, where 
the deviation is defined as the cumulative absolute difference between the observed and expected probabilities of 
each digit (Amiram et al. 2015). In general, a higher FSD_SCORE or KS will suggest lower earnings quality. 
3.3 Multivariate regression models 
To test the hypothesis, we use two sets of multivariate regression models. The first set of models, used to 
study discretionary accruals and the PSCORE, is as follows:  
𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3𝑀&𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑎𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑎𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑎𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑎𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 11𝑎𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑎𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀,         (2)  
where 𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 is the absolute value of discretionary total accruals (DACi,t) or discretionary working capital accruals 
(DWACi,t), both estimated by the modified-Jones models (Jones 1991; Dechow et al. 1995), or discretionary 
working capital accruals (DAMPi,t) estimated by the margin model (Peasnell et al. 2000). These three different 
measures of discretionary accruals are used as substitutes for one another in the regressions.  
Following prior research (e.g., Peasnell et al. 2005; Lee et al. 2006; Botsari and Meeks 2008; Chi and 
Gupta 2009; García Lara et al. 2009; Iqbal et al. 2009; Iqbal and Strong 2010; Baber et al. 2011), we control for 
some important determinants of earnings quality, including seasoned equity offerings (𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡), share-financed 
mergers and acquisitions (𝑀&𝐴𝑖,𝑡), Big Four auditor (𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡), industry-adjusted board independence 
(𝑎𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡), industry-adjusted independence of audit committee (𝑎𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡), the business life cycle (𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡), 
CEO Profile and Earnings Quality    15 
financial distress (𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1), industry-adjusted firm size (𝑎𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1), industry-adjusted market-to-
book ratio (𝑎𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1), industry-adjusted financial leverage (𝑎𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1), and industry-adjusted net operating 
asset ratio (𝑎𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1). Detailed calculations of the control variables can be found in the appendix. 
Secondly, to test the relationship between the PSCORE and financial statement errors, we use the 
following regression: 
𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3𝑀&𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽11𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅/𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 +  𝜀                  (3) 
where 𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is either 𝐹𝑆𝐷_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 or 𝐾𝑆𝑖,𝑡 (used as substitutes). As we include fixed effects in model (3), 
we use firm-level variables of board independence (𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡), audit committee independence (𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡), firm 
size (𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1), the market to book ratio (𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1), financial leverage (𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1), and the net operating 
asset ratio (𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1) in the regression. 
If the coefficients 𝛽1 in the above regressions are positive and significant, this will be evidence in support 
of Hypothesis 1, showing that the PSCORE is positively associated with the proxies for low earnings quality. 
4 Findings 
4.1 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of firm characteristics, the individual factors of the PSCORE, the 
proxies for earnings quality, and the control variables used in the main regressions. At first glance, the numbers 
of observations for the FSD_SCORE and KS are smaller than for the discretionary accruals because, as discussed 
previously, FSD_SCORE and KS require firms to have more than 50 items (or first digits) reported in their 
financial statements. Looking at Panel A, the descriptive statistics for the firm characteristics in the main sample 
are broadly similar to those reported by Goh and Gupta (2016), who use similar data. The descriptive statistics on 
the individual factors of the PSCORE, reported in Panel B, show that, on average, CEOs have low financial 
expertise (medians of all proxies for financial expertise are 1) and high reputations (medians of pPRESS, pROA, 
and pEARLY are 1, 0, and 0, respectively). The statistics also indicate that a minority of CEOs are chairpersons or 
founders of firms (medians of pCHAIRMAN and pFOUNDER are 0). Turning to Panel C, we observe that the 
values of DAC are the highest in all aspects (mean, standard deviation, median, 25th and 75th percentiles), and  































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CEO Profile and Earnings Quality    19 
the values of DAMP are the lowest. Previous studies support these findings, since Botsari and Meeks (2008) find 
that using total accruals has a tendency to result in larger discretionary accruals than using working capital 
accruals, and Peasnell et al. (2000)  provide evidence that the Jones and modified-Jones models produce higher 
discretionary accruals than the margin model when cash flows are unusually high. We also observe that the mean 
and standard deviation of the FSD_SCORE for listed companies in the UK from 2005 to 2012 are 0.0324 and 
0.0098 respectively. These are similar figures to those for listed companies in the US reported by Amiram et al. 
(2015).9 In Panel D, the mean and median of the PSCORE are 3.8065 and 4 respectively, suggesting that the 
difference between the PSCOREs of those firms with high PSCORES and those with low PSCORES is not large, 
given that the PSCORE empirically ranges from zero to eight.10 Panel D also displays that the sample has more 
firms without equity issuance than with equity issuance (all medians of SEO and M&A are 0), has more firms 
audited by Big Four than not (median of AUDIT is 1), has more firms not facing financial distress than firms 
facing financial distress (median of DISTRESS is 0), and has more mature firms than young or growth firms 
(median of CYCLE is 0). 
Table 2, which reports Pearson correlations, indicates that all correlations between the PSCORE and the 
proxies for earnings quality are positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting positive relationships between 
the PSCORE and earnings quality. While there are many insignificant correlations among the independent 
variables, we still test for multicollinearity between the independent variables using variance inflation factors 
(VIFs) obtained from the ordinary least squares regressions. The results (not tabulated) indicate that all VIFs are 
less than 2.47, which is well below 10, the level indicative of multicollinearity as suggested by Neter et al. (1996). 
4.2 Principal component analysis 
We employ principal component analysis to look at whether our methodology for constructing the 
PSCORE is defensible. In Table 3, Panel A shows that most correlation coefficients are very small (absolute 
values are less than 0.15), except for those between pCERT and pCFO (0.4822) and between pEARLY and pROLE 
(0.5159). Many correlations are statistically insignificant. The findings indicate that auto-correlation among 
individual factors is not a concern in constructing the PSCORE. Panel B shows that CEO characteristics have 
 
9 Amiram et al. (2015) report mean and standard deviation of the FSD_SCOREs of listed companies in the US from 2001 to 
2011 to be 0.0296 and 0.0087, respectively. 
10 While the PSCORE theoretically varies from zero to nine, there is no CEO with a PSCORE of nine in the sample. 
20   T. T. Nguyen et al. 
multiple dimensions, as the first component can explain only 17.86% of the variance in the original data and the 
cumulative variance explained by the fourth component is 58.04%. In Panel C, we observe that no individual 
factor has too high a loading.  
In summary, the principal component analysis suggests that no individual factor dominates the other 
factors in explaining the variance of the PSCORE. Therefore, the PSCORE can be used as a single measure of 
CEO characteristics with multiple dimensions. 
4.3 Univariate tests 
The univariate tests study how the earnings quality variables change when the PSCORE changes. It can 
be seen in Table 4 that the mean values of the earnings quality proxies increase monotonically when the PSCORE 
increases. Additionally, the last four rows of Table 4 report the results of the t-test under the null that the means 
of the earnings quality proxies for the high-PSCORE group (PSCORE equals 6, 7, or 8) are the same as those of 
the low-PSCORE group (PSCORE equals 0, 1, or 2). The findings demonstrate that, compared to the low-
PSCORE group, the high-PSCORE group exhibits higher levels of discretionary accruals and higher deviations 
of first digits from Benford’s Law. The mean differences in earnings quality between the two groups are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. 11 In general, the findings from the univariate tests provide preliminary 
evidence supporting Hypothesis 1, that the PSCORE is positively associated with low earnings quality. 
 
 
11 As a robustness test (not tabulated), we define PSCORE groups in another way, with the low-PSCORE group including 
PSCOREs ranging from 0 to 4 and the high-PSCORE group those from 5 to 8. The findings do not change qualitatively. 
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Table 4 Earnings Quality per PSCORE Group 
PSCOREi,t N DACi,t DWACi,t DAMPi,t FSD_SCOREi,t KSi,t 
0 38 0.036 0.029 0.028 0.029 0.080 
1 156 0.059 0.057 0.044 0.029 0.077 
2 443 0.061 0.052 0.048 0.030 0.086 
3 832 0.073 0.056 0.054 0.031 0.085 
4 827 0.078 0.057 0.052 0.032 0.088 
5 662 0.085 0.069 0.069 0.033 0.093 
6 307 0.095 0.077 0.073 0.035 0.101 
7 116 0.111 0.088 0.089 0.036 0.103 
8 14 0.164 0.128 0.084 0.036 0.112 
High (PSCORE=6,7,8) 437 0.102 0.082 0.077 0.035 0.102 
Low (PSCORE=0,1,2) 637 0.059 0.052 0.046 0.030 0.084 
Difference  0.043 0.030 0.032 0.006 0.018 
t-statistics  7.581*** 7.084*** 5.977*** 7.19*** 3.058*** 
Note: This table reports the means by PSCORE for each measure of earnings quality. The last four rows of the 
table show the means of the high-PSCORE and low-PSCORE groups, the mean differences between the two 
groups, and t-statistics obtained from t-tests under the null that the difference is zero.  
Variable definitions are provided in the appendix. *, **, and *** show significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
 
4.4 Multivariate regression results 
This section reports the findings of the main regressions. Table 5 presents the results of the set of regressions 
described in equation (2). Consistent with the hypothesis, we find a positive coefficient on the PSCORE. The 
positive relationships are statistically significant in all models where the dependent variables are DAC (column 
a), DWAC (column b), or DAMP (column c). While the PSCORE coefficients are slightly different across the 
models, the qualitative effects are consistent. In terms of economic significance, the coefficient on DAC suggests 
that a one-unit increase in the PSCORE is associated with an increase of 0.0118 (= 0.309/100*3.8, given that 3.8 
is the mean of the PSCORE, as reported in Table 1) in DAC, which accounts for 15% of its mean (15% = 
0.012/0.0782, given that 0.0782 is the mean of DAC as reported in Table 1). Similarly, an increase in the PSCORE 
of one unit is associated with an increase of 0.0078 in DWAC (or 12.7% of its mean) and of 0.0019 in DAMP (or 
20.5%  of its mean). In general, the findings provide evidence that the PSCORE could act as a red flag regarding 
high levels of abnormal accruals or low earnings quality. The evidence supports Hypothesis 1. 
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 Table 5 also indicates that the control variables have the predicted signs and most coefficients are 
consistently significant across the different models. As expected, the positive coefficients on 𝑆𝐸𝑂 and M&A 
suggest that equity issuance increases earnings management or reduces earnings quality. Besides this, the 
coefficients on 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇, 𝑎𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷, and 𝑎𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐷 are negative, implying that strong corporate governance reduces 
earnings management or increases earnings quality. Also, while large firms are less likely to manipulate earnings, 
over-valued firms engage in more earnings management, evidenced by higher abnormal accruals.  
Moving to financial statement errors, Table 6 reports the findings from the set of regressions described 
by equation (3). The results show that the coefficients on the PSCORE, when the dependent variable is 
FSD_SCORE (Panel A) and KS (Panel B) respectively, are positive and statistically significant in all four 
specifications. In terms of economic significance, for example, in column (d), where the model controls for 
industry and year fixed effects, a one-unit increase in the PSCORE is associated with an increase of 0.0012 in 
FSD_SCORE (or 3.7% of its mean) and an increase of 0.004 in KS (or 4.56% of its mean). In general, the results 
demonstrate that the PSCORE can capture deviations of first digits of figures reported in financial statements from 
what would be expected according to Benford’s Law. 
 To summarize, the findings of the multivariate regressions indicate that the PSCORE is positively 
associated with the established proxies for earnings quality. The relationships are statistically and economically 
significant. The findings support Hypothesis 1 and suggest that the PSCORE could be a useful tool for red flagging 
low earnings quality in individual firms.






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































28   T. T. Nguyen et al. 
4.5 The role of CEOs’ equity-based incentives 
So far, this study has provided evidence that the PSCORE can signal the presence of poor earnings 
quality. This section studies the impact of the CEO’s equity-based incentives on the relationship between the 
PSCORE and poor earnings quality.  
Previous research indicates that CEOs’ equity-based incentives negatively affect earnings quality (Cheng 
and Warfield 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Chava and Purnanandam 2010; Jiang et al. 2010). For 
example, Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) find that firms exhibit abnormally high accruals when there is a strong 
association between the CEO’s total compensation and changes in the firm’s share price. Later studies support the 
idea that earnings quality is affected by the CEO’s equity-based incentives (Cheng and Warfield 2005; Jiang et 
al. 2010). Therefore, it is reasonable to predict that, when CEOs have a high PSCORE and high equity-based 
incentives, i.e. their compensation and wealth are closely tied to reported earnings, they will have a higher 
tendency to manage earnings numbers. In general, we conjecture that the relationships between the PSCORE and 
the proxies for earnings quality will be stronger among firms whose CEOs have high equity-based incentives.  
We follow prior studies to estimate CEOs’ equity-based incentives (e.g., Bergstresser and Philippon 
2006; Armstrong et al. 2010; Jiang et al. 2010; Feng et al. 2011; Armstrong et al. 2013) as follows: 
𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸 =
𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑃𝐶𝑇
(𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑃𝐶𝑇 +  𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐴𝑅𝑌 +  𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆)
  
𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑃𝐶𝑇 = 0.01 𝑥 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸 𝑥 (𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸 + 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁) 
where 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸 is the equity-based incentives of the CEO in question, 𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑃𝐶𝑇 is the change in the CEO’s 
equity holdings corresponding to a 1% change in the stock price, 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸 is the share price at the end of the fiscal 
year, 𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸 is the shares held by the CEO, 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 is the options held by the CEO, 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐴𝑅𝑌 is the total cash 
salary the CEO receives, and 𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆 is the cash bonus the CEO receives. 
We then re-run equations (2) and (3) using the subsamples of firms whose CEOs have high and low 
equity-based incentives, where high (low) equity-based incentives are defined as INCENTIVE being greater than 
or equal to (lower than) the median across all firms.  
 Table 7A and Table 7B report the findings of the estimations of equations (2) and (3), respectively. The 
evidence shows that the coefficients on the PSCORE are higher in the subsample with high equity-based incentive 
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Table 7B Effect of Equity-based Incentives of CEOs on Relationship between PSCORE and Deviations of First 
Digits from Benford’s Law 
 FSD_SCORE   KS 
 High Incentive Low Incentive   High Incentive Low Incentive 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
PSCOREi,t 0.048** 0.027  0.176* 0.084 
 (2.81) (1.50)  (2.49) (1.15) 
SEOi,t -0.001 -0.040  -0.149 -0.235 
 (-0.02) (-0.60)  (-0.62) (-0.86) 
M&Ai,t -0.178 -0.048  -0.618 0.341 
 (-1.70) (-0.37)  (-1.43) (0.63) 
AUDITi,t -0.120* -0.039  -0.364 -0.604* 
 (-2.18) (-0.62)  (-1.61) (-2.36) 
BDINDi,t 0.047 0.134  0.123 0.818 
 (0.35) (0.96)  (0.23) (1.43) 
ACINDi,t 0.018 0.022  -0.124 -0.105 
 (0.20) (0.25)  (-0.33) (-0.29) 
CYCLEi,t -0.216 0.003  -0.105 -0.288 
 (-1.51) (0.02)  (-0.18) (-0.46) 
DISTRESSi,t-1 0.076 0.086  0.198 0.445 
 (1.32) (1.46)  (0.85) (1.84) 
LOGMVEi,t-1 -0.103*** -0.170***  -0.317*** -0.437*** 
 (-5.64) (-8.10)  (-4.21) (-5.07) 
LOGMTBi,t-1 0.160*** 0.154***  0.441*** 0.576*** 
 (5.51) (4.94)  (3.70) (4.48) 
LEVi,t-1 -0.370* -0.283  -0.858 -1.446 
 (-2.18) (-1.53)  (-1.23) (-1.90) 
NOAi,t-1 -0.001 0.000**  -0.003* 0.000 
 (-1.96) (2.87)  (-2.03) (0.96) 
Constant 0.041*** 0.051***  0.108*** 0.136*** 
 (15.14) (19.41)  (9.74) (12.49) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 1638 1559  1638 1559 
Adjusted R2 0.1236 0.1487   0.0761 0.0993 
Note: This table reports the estimations of equation (3): 𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽2𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3𝑀&𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽9𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌/𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 +
 𝜀, 
where 𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is FSD_SCOREi,t (columns 1 and 2) or KSi,t (columns 3 and 4). We run regressions for 
subsamples of firms whose CEOs have high and low equity-based incentives respectively. Firms are defined as 
having CEOs with high (low) equity-based incentives if INCENTIVE is greater than or equal to (lower than) the 
median across all firms.  
All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for easy reading. Industry fixed effects are based on Datastream’s Level 6 
codes. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. Variable definitions are provided in the appendix. *, **, and *** 
show significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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CEOs than that with low equity-based incentive CEOs, in every empirical setting. Importantly, the coefficients 
on the PSCORE are mostly statistically significant when CEOs have high equity-based incentives (i.e. columns 
1, 3, and 5 in Table 7A, and columns 1 and 3 in Table 7B), while they are not statistically significant when CEOs 
have low equity-based incentives (i.e. columns 2, 4, and 6 in Table 7A, and columns 2 and 4 in Table 7B).  
In general, the results are consistent with the conjecture that the relationships between the PSCORE, and 
discretionary accruals and deviations of first digits from Benford’s Law respectively, are stronger for firms whose 
CEOs have high equity-based incentives. The findings provide collaborative evidence that strengthens our 
Hypothesis 1, that the PSCORE is positively associated with low earnings quality.  
4.6 Robustness checks 
4.6.1 A practical version of the PSCORE 
One concern with our approach to constructing the PSCORE is that the measure of pPRESS (press 
coverage) may be biased. Although Milbourn (2003), Francis et al. (2008), and Jian and Lee (2011) find that, 
overall, the newspapers fairly present the reputations of CEOs, Lafond (2008) argues that not all news is good 
news for CEOs’ reputations. Also, one of the main purposes of this study is to develop a tool which can easily be 
applied, and the average practitioner may find it difficult to measure press coverage. To deal with those concerns, 
we build a practical version of the PSCORE, denoted by PSCORE_P, which excludes pPRESS. The calculation 
of the PSCORE now becomes: 
𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸_𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑝𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝑅𝑂𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝐸𝐴𝑅𝐿𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝐹𝑂𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑝𝐶𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑝𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡       (4) 
The practical PSCORE only includes measures whose data are collected from the curriculum vitae of 
CEOs and the financial statements of their companies. We re-run equations (2) and (3), replacing the PSCORE 
with PSCORE_P. The evidence (not tabulated) indicates that the coefficients on PSCORE_P are still positive and 
statistically significant. In other words, there are strong positive relationships between PSCORE_P and both 
discretionary accruals and deviations from Benford’s Law. In general, the findings suggest that the average 
practitioner could apply PSCORE_P to detect cases where reported earnings have low quality. 
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4.6.2 Propensity score matching 
A potential problem with non-experimental study is that estimations of multiple regressions may be 
biased because of model misspecifications (Shipman et al. 2017). In this study, the allocation of CEOs with high 
and low PSCOREs is not random. Thus, the average treatment effect of the PSCORE on earnings quality may be 
biased. There may be confounding factors which determine both earnings quality and the allocation of CEOs with 
high and low PSCOREs.  
We follow previous studies (Shipman et al. 2017; Nguyen et al. 2020) and use the propensity score 
matching method to reduce any estimation bias caused by confounding factors. The procedure is as follows. First, 
we need to identify observations with high and low PSCOREs. We create a dummy variable, ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸, 
which equals one if the CEO’s PSCORE is greater than or equal to 5, and zero otherwise. We classify observations 
into two groups: treatment (ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 = 1) and control (ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 = 0). Second, we run a logistic 
regression between ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 and explanatory variables consisting of the control variables used in the main 
regression described by equation (2). After that, we calculate the conditional odds ratio of having a CEO with a 
high PSCORE. Third, we match (without replacement) each treatment observation to the control observation 
which has the closest odds ratio, requiring a maximum calliper of 0.01. Fourth, to assess the matching quality, we 
use a simple t-test to determine whether the remaining differences between the treatment and control observations 
are insignificant. The above four-step procedure for the propensity score matching model is similar to the 
recommendations of Shipman et al. (2017).  
 The results of the propensity score matching procedure are presented in Table 8A. Panel A shows the 
estimations of the logistic regression. The matched sample has 2,180 observations, with 1,090 treatment and 1,090 
control observations. Panel B reports the results of t-tests, under the null that the mean difference in firm 
characteristics between the two groups is zero. The evidence shows that, while the mean differences in firm 
characteristics are significant in the full sample, all of the differences are insignificant at the 10% level in the 
matched sample,  suggesting that the matching method is of a high quality. Using this propensity score matched 
sample, Table 8B provides evidence consistent with the main result, that the PSCORE is positively associated 
with discretionary accruals. We also find a positive and significant association between the PSCORE and 
deviations of first digits from Benford’s Law (not tabulated). In general, the evidence is in line with Hypothesis 
1. 
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Table 8A Propensity Score Matching 
Panel A: Logistic model       
  Coefficient z-statistic           
SEOi,t 0.104* 1.72      
M&Ai,t -0.03 -0.26      
AUDITi,t -0.138** -2.57      
BDINDi,t -0.303** -2.41      
ACINDi,t -0.297*** -3.7      
CYCLEi,t 0.135 0.91      
DISTRESSi,t-1 0.183*** 3.35      
LOGMVE i,t-1 -0.141*** -8.72      
LOGMTB i,t-1 0.133*** 5.06      
LEV i,t-1 -0.404** -2.56      
NOA i,t-1 0 -1.08      
Constant 1.893*** 12.26      
Observations 3,395       
Pseudo R2 0.0958            
Panel B: Mean differences in firm characteristics before and after matching 
 Before matching (a)  After matching (b) 
 Treated Control t-statistic  Treated Control t-statistic 
SEOi,t 0.306 0.172 8.37***  0.182 0.182 0 
M&Ai,t 0.045 0.04 0.72  0.042 0.043 -0.1 
AUDITi,t 0.407 0.639 -13.11***  0.609 0.621 -0.56 
BDINDi,t 0.298 0.416 -14.14***  0.395 0.398 -0.33 
ACINDi,t 0.035 0.152 -12.62***  0.095 0.088 0.61 
CYCLEi,t 0.042 0.018 3.54***  0.023 0.021 0.29 
DISTRESSi,t-1 0.371 0.227 8.46***  0.216 0.234 -1 
LOGMVE i,t-1 10.3 11.745 -20.76***  11.405 11.413 -0.11 
LOGMTB i,t-1 0.702 0.682 0.54  0.669 0.644 0.63 
LEV i,t-1 0.119 0.16 -7.5***  0.141 0.146 -0.9 
NOA i,t-1 10.581 9.558 0.15  8.144 4.534 1 
Observations 1099 2296   1,090 1,090  
Note: This table reports the results of the propensity score matching approach.  
Panel A reports the estimations of the following logistic regression: 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 1)  = 𝛼 +
𝛽1𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡+𝛽2𝑀&𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽8𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1. We match each treatment observation 
(highPSCORE=1) with one control observation (highPSCORE = 0) without replacement, where highPSCORE 
equals one if PSCORE is greater than or equal to the median across all firms, and zero otherwise. We require a 
maximum calliper of 0.01 (odds ratio) for matched samples.  
Panel B reports the means of the firm characteristics before matching (column a) and after matching (column b), 
and the t-statistic for a t-test under the null that the mean difference between the treated and control groups is zero.  
Variable definitions are provided in the appendix. *, **, and *** show significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
CEO Profile and Earnings Quality    35 
 
Table 8B Propensity Score Matching: PSCORE and Discretionary Accruals 
  DAC (a)   DWAC (b)   DAMP (c) 
  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic 
PSCOREi,t 0.280* (2.39)  0.089 (0.94)  0.180* (2.05) 
SEOi,t 2.130*** (4.83)  1.253*** (3.55)  1.237*** (3.75) 
M&Ai,t 1.996* (2.43)  4.293*** (6.53)  3.468*** (5.64) 
AUDITi,t -2.250*** (-6.16)  -1.186*** (-4.06)  -1.163*** (-4.26) 
aBDINDi,t 0.004 (0.39)  -0.013 (-1.67)  -0.012 (-1.69) 
aACINDi,t -0.003 (-0.40)  0.001 (0.22)  -0.004 (-0.73) 
CYCLEi,t 2.272* (2.04)  1.592 (1.78)  0.453 (0.54) 
DISTRESSi,t-1 1.195** (2.97)  0.179 (0.56)  -0.226 (-0.75) 
aLOGMVEi,t-1 -0.002 (-1.47)  -0.003** (-2.98)  -0.003** (-2.71) 
aLOGMTBi,t-1 0.008*** (3.78)  0.011*** (6.29)  0.011*** (6.69) 
aLEVi,t-1 -0.037*** (-3.37)  -0.023** (-2.63)  -0.024** (-2.92) 
aNOAi,t-1 0.000 (0.41)  -0.000 (-1.64)  -0.000 (-0.39) 
Constant 0.069*** (13.20)  0.058*** (13.91)  0.053*** (13.66) 
Observations 2180   2180   2180  
Adjusted R2 0.0624   0.0712   0.0709  
Note: Using the propensity score matched sample, this table shows the results of the following regression: 𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡  =
𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3𝑀&𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑎𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑎𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽8𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑎𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑎𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝑎𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑎𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀, 
where 𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 can be DAC (column a), DWAC (column b), or DAMP (column c) (used as substitutes). All 
coefficients are multiplied by 100 for easy reading. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. Variable definitions are 
provided in the appendix. *, **, and *** show significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
4.6.3 CEO overconfidence 
In the next robustness test, we examine whether the results hold when including a proxy for CEO 
overconfidence. Existing literature (e.g., Galasso and Simcoe 2011; Hirshleifer et al. 2012) indicates a relationship 
between CEO overconfidence and earnings management (Schrand and Zechman 2012; Ahmed and Duellman 
2013; Hsieh et al. 2014). For example, Schrand and Zechman (2012) examine a sample of firms subject to 
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (AAERs) and 
report that CEO overconfidence is directly related to the likelihood of misstated earnings, suggesting an optimistic 
bias among overconfident CEOs that causes financial reporting misstatements. In this section, we expand the 
PSCORE to include an accounting-based measure of CEO overconfidence (Campbell et al. 2011; Schrand and 
Zechman 2012; Kim et al. 2016). The PSCORE with CEO overconfidence, denoted by PSCORE_O, is then used 
in the regressions described in equations (2) and (3).  
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Table 9A PSCORE, CEO Overconfidence, and Discretionary Accruals 
  DAC (a) DWAC (b) DAMP (c) 
  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
PSCORE_Oi,t 0.283*** (2.79) 0.231*** (2.85) 0.338*** (4.45) 
SEOi,t 3.111*** (8.29) 2.177*** (7.27) 1.824*** (6.51) 
M&Ai,t 1.174 (1.61) 3.044*** (5.23) 2.938*** (5.39) 
AUDITi,t -2.140*** (-6.42) -0.972*** (-3.66) -0.931*** (-3.74) 
aBDINDi,t 0.000 (0.00) -0.001 (-0.20) 0.002 (0.38) 
aACINDi,t -0.002 (-0.29) 0.001 (0.25) -0.001 (-0.34) 
CYCLEi,t 2.264** (2.49) 2.107*** (2.91) 0.617 (0.91) 
DISTRESSi,t-1 0.920*** (2.67) -0.043 (-0.16) -0.350 (-1.36) 
aLOGMVEi,t-1 -0.002** (-2.06) -0.004*** (-4.70) -0.004*** (-5.09) 
aLOGMTBi,t-1 0.010*** (5.16) 0.014*** (9.09) 0.014*** (9.84) 
aLEVi,t-1 -0.043*** (-4.58) -0.034*** (-4.49) -0.030*** (-4.29) 
aNOAi,t-1 -0.000 (-1.07) -0.000** (-2.47) -0.000 (-1.19) 
Constant 0.068*** (13.87) 0.051*** (13.14) 0.046*** (12.50) 
Observations 3395  3395  3395  
Adjusted R2 0.0903   0.0994   0.1013   
Note: This table reports the findings when the PSCORE includes a measure of CEO overconfidence. We run the 
following regression:  
 𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸_𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3𝑀&𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑎𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑎𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽7𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑎𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑎𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝑎𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑎𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝜀, 
where 𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 is replaced by DACi,t (column a), DWACi,t (column b) or DAMPi,t (column c). All coefficients are 
multiplied by 100 for easy reading. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. Variable definitions are provided in the 
appendix. *, **, and *** show significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 9B PSCORE, CEO Overconfidence and Financial Statement Errors 
  FSD_SCORE (a) KS (b) 
  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
PSCORE_Oi,t 0.021* (1.75) 0.086* (1.77) 
SEOi,t -0.016 (-0.38) -0.156 (-0.87) 
M&Ai,t -0.141* (-1.72) -0.276 (-0.82) 
AUDITi,t -0.087** (-2.15) -0.442*** (-2.67) 
BDINDi,t 0.072 (0.77) 0.337 (0.88) 
ACINDi,t 0.002 (0.04) -0.127 (-0.49) 
CYCLEi,t -0.148 (-1.44) -0.332 (-0.79) 
DISTRESSi,t-1 0.100** (2.47) 0.381** (2.30) 
LOGMVEi,t-1 -0.131*** (-9.69) -0.383*** (-6.90) 
LOGMTBi,t-1 0.156*** (7.53) 0.488*** (5.76) 
LEVi,t-1 -0.391*** (-3.24) -1.312*** (-2.65) 
NOAi,t-1 0.000** (2.27) 0.000 (0.52) 
Constant 0.046*** (25.35) 0.125*** (16.66) 
Observations 3197  3197  
Adjusted R2 0.1286  0.0854  
Note: This table reports the findings when the PSCORE includes a measure of CEO overconfidence. We run the 
following regression: 
𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸_𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3𝑀&𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽7𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌/𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 +  𝜀, 
where 𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is FSD_SCOREi,t (column a) or KSi,t (column b). All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for easy 
reading. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. Variable definitions are provided in the appendix. *, **, and *** 




Table 9A reports the findings from regression (2), where the main variable of interest is PSCORE_O. In 
all columns, we find that the coefficients on PSCORE_O are positive and significant at 1%. Also, we observe that 
the magnitudes of the coefficients on the PSCORE_O are higher than those reported in Table 6 of the main 
findings, in nearly every case, suggesting that CEO overconfidence is another valid indicator of earnings quality. 
Similarly, the relationships between financial statement errors and PSCORE_O, as reported in Table 9B, are 
positive and significant. The findings continue to hold strongly when the PSCORE includes CEO overconfidence.  
4.6.4 The PSCORE and real earnings management 
Next, we are interested in seeing whether there is any relationship between the PSCORE and proxies for 
real earnings management. Roychowdhury (2006) argues that manipulation of earnings through real business 
transactions (e.g., increased price discounts or more lenient credit terms, overproduction, and cut down or delayed 
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discretionary expenditures) leads to abnormal cash flows from operations, abnormal production costs, and 
abnormal discretionary expenses. Although we use a proxy in the first analysis, we perform a manipulation check 
by using real earnings management indicators, as in previous studies (Roychowdhury 2006; Athanasakou et al. 
2009; Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Zang 2012). We take into account abnormal cash flows (DCF), abnormal 
production costs (DPROD), and abnormal discretionary expenditures (DDISEXP).12 We also have a measure of 
total real earnings management (REM), where REM = DCF + DPROD + DDISEXP. We run the following 
regression: 
𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3𝑀&𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑎𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑎𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑎𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑎𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑎𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀  (5) 
where EMi,t can be DCFi,t, DPRODi,t, DDISEXPi,t, or REMi,t (used as substitutes). In equation (5), we do not 
include the auditor or net operating accruals control variables, because there is little knowledge of how those 
factors influence real earnings management. As reported in Table 10, the coefficients on all the proxies for real 
earnings management are positive and statistically significant at least at the 10% level.  
4.6.5 Other tests 
Our main sample excludes joint CEOs as their impact on earnings quality might be unclear. In a 
robustness test, we include joint CEOs in the sample. For companies with joint CEOs, we select the one with 
potentially the greater influence on the preparation and review of the financial statements, based on three-stage 
criteria. In the first stage, we select CEOs based on CEO status at year-end. If joint CEOs both have CEO status 
at year-end, in the second stage, we choose the CEO who has worked at the company for longer. If we still cannot 
separate them, in the third stage, we choose the one with the higher salary. As a result, the sample increases from 
3,395 to 3,433 firm-year observations (618 unique companies in 49 industries). The results (not tabulated) do not 
 
12 We note that we measure real earnings management using the absolute values of residuals estimated from the models of 
Roychowdhury (2006) for consistency with the construction of the PSCORE, which is designed to signal earnings quality 
without a particular emphasis on the directional effects of earnings management. When we use the real values of the residuals, 
the findings show that the coefficients on the PSCORE are still positive. Generally, the results seem to support the notion that 
the PSCORE is positively associated with the established proxies for real earnings management. 
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change qualitatively. In general, the findings from this robustness test provide evidence to strengthen our most 
important finding that the PSCORE could act as a red flag for poor earnings quality. 
5 Conclusions 
This research develops a composite score, namely the PSCORE, which captures the profile of the CEO, 
and examines whether it can provide a signal as to quality of earnings. Based on prior research, the PSCORE 
aggregates nine aspects of the CEO profile. We employ different types of proxies for earnings quality, namely 
discretionary accruals (Jones 1991; Dechow et al. 1995; Peasnell et al. 2000) and financial statement errors 
measured by deviations of first digits of figures reported in financial statements from Benford’s Law (Amiram et 
al. 2015). Using a sample of 3,395 firm-year observations (615 unique firms) of listed companies on the London 
Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2012, the study finds that the PSCORE is positively associated with discretionary 
accruals and deviations of first digits from Benford’s Law. The relationships are statistically and economically 
significant. Further analyses indicate that the associations between the PSCORE and established proxies for 
earnings quality become more pronounced when CEOs have high equity-based incentives. The findings are robust 
to several robustness tests. In general, the results demonstrate that the PSCORE can be used as an effective tool 
to red flag poor earnings quality.  
The paper contributes to the existing literature and practice in several ways. First, the PSCORE developed 
here is easy to construct because it mainly requires data collected from the curriculum vitae of CEOs. Second, the 
study is the first of its kind to aggregate various characteristics of CEOs to signal earnings quality. Third, the 
PSCORE can highlight the presence of different kinds of earnings manipulation – accrual earnings management 
and financial statement errors – regardless of whether biases in financial statements result from intentional or 
unintentional acts of managers. This suggests that the PSCORE could be a useful risk indicator for practitioners 
who need an easy way to identify risks of poor earnings quality. The findings are relevant for research not only in 
the UK but also in the US and other international contexts. 
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APPENDIX: Variable Definitions  
 
Variable Definition 
Individual factors of the PSCORE 
pAGE equals one if either (i) the age of the CEO is less than or equal to the 25th percentile of the 
industry-year (identified by Datastream Level 6) or (ii) the CEO is one year or less from 
retirement age, and zero otherwise. The retirement ages of men and women in the UK are 
65 and 60, respectively, for the period from 1948 to 2010; from April 2010 to March 2020, 
the retirement age of women increases by one month every month until it reaches 65 (Bozio 
et al. 2010).  
pCERT equals one if the CEO does not have an MBA or CPA equivalent, and zero otherwise. CPA 
equivalent is defined as a professional accounting certification issued by one of the five 
qualifying bodies currently accredited by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC, 2016): 
Association of International Accountants (AIA), Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA), 
Chartered Accountants Ireland (CAI), Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and 
Wales (ICAEW), Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS) (or international 
equivalent certifications). 
pCFO  equals one if the CEO does not have work experience as a chief financial officer, and zero 
otherwise. 
pCHAIRMAN equals one if the CEO serves as the chairperson of the board of directors of the firm, and 
zero otherwise. 
pEARLY equals one if the CEO is within their first three years of service at the firm, and zero 
otherwise. 
pFOUNDER equals one if the CEO is the founder or a co-founder of the firm, and zero otherwise. 
pPRESS equals one if the number of newspapers simultaneously citing the name of the CEO and the 
company they work for in the year question is less than the corresponding industry mean 
(identified by Datastream Level 6), and zero otherwise. 
pROA equals one if the average of the industry-adjusted return on assets (aveROA) during the last 
three years of the CEO’s tenure is negative, and zero otherwise, where aveROA is (i) the 
average of the industry-adjusted return on assets in years t, t-1 and t-2 if the CEO is in their 
third year of tenure, or (ii) the average of the industry-adjusted return on assets in years t 
and t-1 if the CEO is in their second year of tenure, or (iii) the industry-adjusted return on 
assets in year t if the CEO is in their first year of tenure. Return on assets equals net income 
before extraordinary items divided by total assets. 
 pROLE equals one if the number of years the CEO has been working as the CEO of their current 
firm is less than the corresponding industry-year mean (identified by Datastream Level 6), 
and zero otherwise. 
PSCORE = pCFO + pCERT + pROLE + pPRESS + pROA + pEARLY + pFOUNDER
+ pCHAIRMAN + pAGE 
PSCORE_O PSCORE with CEO overconfidence: 
𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸_𝑂 =  𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 +  𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐶𝐸 
where CEO_OVERCONFIDENCE is CEO-level overconfidence. We first calculate the 
measure of firm-level overconfidence (Campbell et al. 2011; Schrand and Zechman 2012; 
Kim et al. 2016), denoted by OVERCONFIDENCE, which has a value of one if a firm-year 
observation meets at least three out of the following five conditions:  
(i) INVEST is ranked in the top industry-year (Datastream Level 6) quartile. 
INVEST is excess investment, which is the residual of the regression: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
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(ii) ACQUISITION is ranked in the top industry-year (Datastream Level 6) 
quartile. ACQUISITION is equal to net acquisition (cash flow statements) 
scaled by total assets. 
(iii) The debt-to-equity ratio is ranked in the top industry-year (Datastream Level 
6) quartile. The debt-to-equity ratio is equal to the sum of long-term debts and 
short-term debts divided by the market value of equity. 
(iv) Either convertible debt is greater than zero or preferred stock is greater than 
0. 
(v) Zero dividend yield. 
Otherwise, it has a value of zero. Following Campbell et al. (2011) and Kim et al. (2016), 
CEO-level overconfidence takes a value of one starting from the first year in which the 
CEO’s firm has a score for OVERCONFIDENCE equal to one. 
Proxies for earnings quality 
DAC Absolute values of discretionary total accruals (DAC), estimated by the modified-Jones 
models (Jones 1991; Dechow et al. 1995) with at least ten observations for each industry-
year (Datastream Level 6). 𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = |
𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
− [?̂? + ?̂?1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1














) + 𝛽2 (
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3  (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡; 𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is total accruals, which equals net 
income before extraordinary items minus net cash flows from operations; 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 is total 
assets of firm i at end of year t–1; ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 and ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 are change in sales and change in 
receivables from year t–1 to year t of firm i, respectively; 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is gross plant, property and 
equipment of firm i at end of year t. 
DAMP Absolute values of discretionary working capital accruals (DAMP) estimated by the margin 
model of Peasnell et al. (2000) with at least ten observations for each industry-year 
(Datastream Level 6). DAMP are the absolute values of the residuals of the following 
regression: 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 (
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2 (
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡;  𝑊𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is working capital 
accruals, 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = (∆𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 −  ∆𝐶𝐻𝐸𝑖,𝑡) − (∆𝐶𝐿𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡) [∆𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is change in current 
assets; ∆𝐶𝐻𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is change in cash and cash equivalents; ∆𝐶𝐿𝑖,𝑡 is change in current liabilities; 
∆𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is change in short-term debts]; 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 is total assets of firm i at end of year t–1; 
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is sales of firm i in year t; ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is receivables from year t–1 to year t of firm i. 
DWAC Absolute values of discretionary working capital accruals (DWAC) estimated by the 
modified-Jones models (Jones 1991; Dechow et al. 1995) with at least ten observations for 




− [?̂? + ?̂?1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + ?̂?2 (
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1




?̂?, ?̂?1, ?̂?2, ?̂?3 are coefficients estimated by the model: 
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1







) + 𝛽3  (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡; 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is working capital accruals, 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = (∆𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 −
 ∆𝐶𝐻𝐸𝑖,𝑡) − (∆𝐶𝐿𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡) [∆𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is change in current assets; ∆𝐶𝐻𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is change in 
cash and cash equivalents; ∆𝐶𝐿𝑖,𝑡 is change in current liabilities; ∆𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is change in short-
term debts]; 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 is total assets of firm i at end of year t–1; ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 and ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 are change 
in sales and change in receivables from year t–1 to year t of firm i respectively; 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is 
gross plant, property and equipment of firm i at end of year t. 
FSD_SCORE Mean absolute deviation of the first digits of figures reported in the financial statements of 





 ; where 𝑂𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑉𝐸𝐷𝑑,𝑖,𝑡 is the observed (actual) probability of 
digit d of firm i in year t; 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑑  is the expected probability of first digit d as defined 
by Benford’s Law; and d = 1, 2, …, 9. 
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KS The maximum cumulative absolute deviation of the first digits of items reported in the 
financial statements from those expected by Benford’s Law: 
𝐾𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{|𝑂𝐷1,𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸𝐷1|, |(𝑂𝐷1,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑂𝐷2,𝑖,𝑡) − (𝐸𝐷1
+ 𝐸𝐷2)|, … , |(𝑂𝐷1,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑂𝐷2,𝑖,𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝑂𝐷9,𝑖,𝑡) − (𝐸𝐷1 + 𝐸𝐷2 + ⋯
+ 𝐸𝐷9)|}         
where 𝑂𝐷𝑑,𝑖,𝑡 is the cumulative observed probability of the first digit d (d = 1, 2, …, 9) of 
firm i in year t; 𝐸𝐷𝑑 is the expected probability of the first digit d (d = 1, 2, …, 9), as defined 
by Benford’s Law. 
DCF Absolute value of abnormal cash flow. DCF is the absolute value of the residual of the 
following regression for each (Datastream Level 6) industry and each year with at least 
ten observations:  
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2 (
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 (
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 is net cash flows from operations; 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 is total opening assets; 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is 
sales; ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is sales in year t minus sales in year t-1; i is firm i; t is the year; and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is 
the error term. 
DDISEXP Absolute value of abnormal discretionary expenditures. DDISEXP is the absolute value of 
the residual of the following regression for each (Datastream Level 6) industry and each 






) + β1 (
REVi,t−1
Ai,t−1
) + εi,t  
where 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is discretionary expenditures, which equals R&D expenses plus selling 
and administrative expenses; 𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 is total opening assets; 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 is sales in year t-1; i is 
the firm; t is the year; 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. 
DPROD Absolute value of abnormal production costs. DPROD is the absolute value of the residual 
of the following regression for each (Datastream Level 6) industry and each year with at 






) + β1 (
REVi,t
Ai,t−1
) + β2 (
∆REVi,t
Ai,t−1
) + β3 (
∆REVi,t−1
Ai,t−1
) + εi,t  
where 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is production costs, which equal the sum of cost of goods sold and change 
in inventories from year t-1 to year t; 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is sales; ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡  is sales in year t minus sales 
in year t-1; ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 is sales in year t-1 minus sales in year t-2; 𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 is total opening 
assets; i is the firm; t is the year; 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. 
REM Total real earnings management. REM = DCF + DPROD + DDISEXP 
Control variables 
aACIND Industry-adjusted audit committee independence, where audit committee independence is 
the percentage of independent members on the audit committee. Industry-adjusted value 
equals the firm value minus the mean for the corresponding industry-year. 
aBDIND Industry-adjusted board independence, where board independence is the percentage of 
independent directors on the board. 
aLEV Industry-adjusted leverage, where leverage (LEV) equals the sum of long-term debts and 
short-term debts, scaled by total assets. 
aLOGMBT Industry-adjusted market-to-book ratio, where the market-to-book ratio (LOGMTB) is the 
natural log of the ratio of the market value to the book value of equity. 
aLOGMVE Industry-adjusted firm size, where firm size (LOGMVE) equals the natural log of the market 
value of equity. 
aNOA Industry-adjusted net operating asset ratio (NOA), where 𝑁𝑂𝐴 = [𝐶𝐸𝑄 + (𝐷𝐿𝑇𝑇 +
𝐷𝐿𝐶) − 𝐶𝐻𝐸]/𝑅𝐸𝑉, where CEQ is the total book value of equity, DLTT is long-term debts, 
DLC is short-term debts; CHE is cash and cash equivalent; REV is sales. 
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AUDIT equals one if the firm is audited by a Big Four audit firm, and zero otherwise. 
CYCLE Indicator for the business life cycle, calculated based on Dickinson (2011), and equals one 
if a firm has negative CFO, negative CFI, and positive CFF (young firm), or positive CFO, 
negative CFI, and positive CFF (growth firm), and zero if a firm has positive CFO, negative 
CFI, and negative CFF (mature firm), where CFO is cash flows from operating activities, 
CFI is cash flows from investing activities, and CFF is cash flows from financing activities. 
DISTRESS equals one if ZSCORE is negative, and zero otherwise, where ZSCORE, following Taffler 
(1983), is calculated as follows: ZSCORE = 3.2 +  12.18 ∗ X1  +  2.50 ∗ X2  −  10.68 ∗
X3  +  0.029 ∗ X4, where X1 =  
Profit before tax
current liabilities
, X2 =  
Current assets
Total liabilities








INCENTIVE Equity-based incentives of the CEO: 
𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸 =
𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑃𝐶𝑇
(𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑃𝐶𝑇 +  𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐴𝑅𝑌 +  𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆)
  
𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑃𝐶𝑇 = 0.01 𝑥 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸 𝑥 (𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸 + 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁) 
where 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸 is the equity-based incentives of the CEO; 𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑃𝐶𝑇 is the dollar 
change in the CEO’s equity holdings following a 1% change in the stock price; 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸 is 
the closing share price; 𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸 is the number of shares held by the CEO; 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 is the 
number of options held by the CEO; 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐴𝑅𝑌 is the total cash salary the CEO receives; and 
𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆 is the cash bonus the CEO receives. Compensation data are manually collected 
from the Bloomberg database. 
M&A equals one if a firm announces a share-financed merger and acquisition deal, and zero 
otherwise. 
SEO equals one if a firm issues a significant portion of equity (outstanding shares increase by at 
least 5% and proceeds from equity issuance are positive), and zero otherwise. 
 
